From hierarchies to levels: new solutions for games with hierarchical structure
Autor: | Gerard van der Laan, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, René van den Brink, Oriol Tejada |
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Přispěvatelé: | Econometrics and Operations Research, Tinbergen Institute, Universitat de Barcelona |
Rok vydání: | 2017 |
Předmět: |
Statistics and Probability
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Economics and Econometrics Class (set theory) Theoretical computer science Computer science Generalization TU-game Structure (category theory) Set (abstract data type) Mathematics (miscellaneous) 0502 economics and business Shapley value 050207 economics Hierarchical structure Axiomes Axiom Game theory Cooperative games (Mathematics) 050205 econometrics Mathematics Bondareva–Shapley theorem Non-cooperative game Axioms 05 social sciences Stochastic game ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Cooperative game theory hierarchical structure levels structure Shapley Value axiomatization Teoria de jocs Levels structure Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Axiomatization Statistics Probability and Uncertainty Mathematical economics Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
Zdroj: | Álvarez-Mozos, M, van den Brink, R, van der Laan, G & Tejada, O 2017, ' From hierarchies to levels : new solutions for games with hierarchical structure ', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 1089-1113 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0572-z International Journal of Game Theory, 46(4), 1089-1113. Springer Verlag Dipòsit Digital de la UB Universidad de Barcelona Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname |
ISSN: | 1432-1270 0020-7276 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-017-0572-z |
Popis: | Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players’ possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we propose three new solutions for games with hierarchical structure and characterize them by properties that relate a player’s payoff to the payoffs of other players located in specific positions in the structure relative to that player. To define each of these solutions, we consider a certain mapping that transforms any hierarchical structure into a levels structure, and then we apply the standard generalization of the Shapley Value to the class of games with levels structure. The transformations that map the set of hierarchical structures to the set of levels structures are also studied from an axiomatic viewpoint by means of properties that relate a player’s position in both types of structure. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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