The countries they know best: how national principals influence European commissioners and their cabinets
| Autor: | Renke Deckarm |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Public Administration Sociology and Political Science business.industry Member states 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies Principal–agent problem 02 engineering and technology Commission Public relations 0506 political science Political science 050602 political science & public administration Member state Cabinet (room) Nationality European commission business |
| Zdroj: | Journal of European Public Policy. 24:447-466 |
| ISSN: | 1466-4429 1350-1763 |
| Popis: | This article analyses the composition of European commissioners’ private offices (cabinets) in order to explain their intended behaviour when deciding between serving European or member states’ interests. The article conceptualizes the relationship between the home country and the commissioner as a principal–agent relationship. It also accounts for contextual impacts on cabinet composition. This article analyses the biographical information of 1,343 members of 149 individual cabinets, as well as data from 11 expert interviews. It finds that both the relationship to the home country and the context in which a commissioner works affect her cabinet composition. Surprisingly, member states’ selection efforts do not have the intended effects. The Commission is neither completely independent nor a member state agent. The growing importance of supranational actors and a more regulated context can impede individual commissioners from serving the interest of the ‘country they know best’. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|