Expert Deference about the Epistemic and Its Metaepistemological Significance
| Autor: | Michele Palmira |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
010506 paleontology
media_common.quotation_subject Judgement Deference Teoria del coneixement Theory of knowledge 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 01 natural sciences Objectivitat Epistemology Philosophy Objectivity Phenomenon 060302 philosophy Psychology Objectivity (philosophy) Realism 0105 earth and related environmental sciences media_common |
| Zdroj: | Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 50:524-538 |
| ISSN: | 1911-0820 0045-5091 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/can.2019.46 |
| Popis: | This paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one’s judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed explanation. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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