Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?
| Autor: | Johan N. M. Lagerlöf |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2004 |
| Předmět: |
Value of information
Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject Public policy jel:D89 Strategic delegation jel:D69 Microeconomics Economics Informational lobbying media_common Commitment device Interest groups Public economics Public information acquisition value of information welfare interest groups informational lobbying strategic delegation Faculty of History and Social Science\Economics informational lobbying interest groups public information acquisition strategic delegation value of information welfare jel:D78 Public good Free riding Incentive Welfare Public information acquisition Externality |
| Zdroj: | Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106 (1) |
| ISSN: | 1467-9442 0347-0520 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.t01-1-00351.x |
| Popis: | The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy-maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one-country and a two-country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy-maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some - sometimes even all - citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of 'informational lobbying' are also discussed. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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