What memory is—Not!

Autor:	J. M. Fritzman, William A. Rottschaefer
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Male Cognitive science Consciousness Memory Episodic General Neuroscience media_common.quotation_subject Qualia General Medicine Philosophy Feeling Humans Semantic memory Suspect Psychology Set (psychology) Episodic memory General Psychology media_common
Zdroj:	WIREs Cognitive Science. 13
ISSN:	1939-5086 1939-5078
DOI:	10.1002/wcs.1584
Popis:	Rejecting the received account, which includes procedural and semantic memory, Stanley B. Klein claims that only episodic memory is genuine memory. This is so, he asserts, because only episodic memory is partly constituted by a quale, a Nagelian "what it is like" feeling of the past. However, his actual position reveals a very different set of claims about memory, one that involves a distinctive feel, distinct from Nagelian qualia and other versions of what qualia are. We argue that Klein's actual position significantly differs from what he claims memory is. And we try to describe what Kleinian qualia should feel like. We suspect that they might not feel like anything at all. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
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