Agency Conflicts around the World
| Autor: | Erwan Morellec, Boris Nikolov, Norman Schürhoff |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
040101 forestry
Value (ethics) Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Capital structure Corporate governance 05 social sciences Agency cost 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Legal history Structural Estimation Corporate Governance Variable (computer science) Market economy Shareholder Capital Structure Accounting 0502 economics and business Agency (sociology) Agency Conflicts 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Business Finance |
| Zdroj: | The Review of Financial Studies. 31:4232-4287 |
| ISSN: | 1465-7368 0893-9454 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/rfs/hhy018 |
| Popis: | We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions. Recent governance reforms in Europe have significantly reduced agency costs. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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