Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms
| Autor: | Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia, M. Bumin Yenmez, Peter F. Chen |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Mathematical optimization
Mechanism design Matching (statistics) Computer science 05 social sciences Preference Unit demand Bargaining theory If and only if 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics Mathematical economics General Economics Econometrics and Finance Mechanism (sociology) 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 8:202-214 |
| ISSN: | 1945-7685 1945-7669 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/mic.20150035 |
| Popis: | We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents. (JEL C78, D82) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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