Optimal financing with tokens
| Autor: | Sebastian Gryglewicz, Erwan Morellec, Simon Mayer |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Business Economics |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Moral hazard Strategy and Management coin offering Security token optimal financing Equity financing Accounting markets 0502 economics and business Agency (sociology) contracts security tokens 040101 forestry Finance 050208 finance business.industry 05 social sciences Equity (finance) 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences agency conflicts Incentive 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY Cash flow Business |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Financial Economics, 142(3), 1038-1067. Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0304-405X |
| Popis: | We develop a model in which a start-up firm issues tokens to finance a digital platform, which creates agency conflicts between platform developers and outsiders. We show that token financing is preferred to equity financing unless the platform expects strong cash flows, has large financing needs, or faces severe agency conflicts. Tokens are characterized by their utility features, facilitating transactions, and security features, granting cash flow rights. While security features trigger endogenous network effects and spur platform adoption, they also dilute developers' equity stake and incentives so that the optimal level of security features decreases with agency conflicts and financing needs. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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