The dynamics of concealment
| Autor: | Felipe Varas, Stephen J. Terry, Jeremy Bertomeu, Ivan Marinovic |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
040101 forestry
Persuasion Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Earnings Market uncertainty media_common.quotation_subject Strategy and Management Structural estimation 05 social sciences 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Information loss Voluntary disclosure Microeconomics Dynamics (music) Accounting 0502 economics and business Key (cryptography) 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Business Corporate disclosure Finance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Financial Economics. 143:227-246 |
| ISSN: | 0304-405X |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.025 |
| Popis: | Firm managers likely have more information than outsiders. If managers strategically conceal information, market uncertainty will increase. We develop a dynamic corporate disclosure model, estimating the model using the management earnings forecasts of US public companies. The model, based on the buildup of reputations by managers over time, matches key facts about forecast dynamics. We find that 80% of firms strategically manage information, that managers have superior information around half of the time, and that firms conceal information about 40% of the time. Concealment increases market uncertainty by just under 8%, a sizable information loss. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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