On the meaning of EPR’s Reality Criterion
Autor: | Márton Gömöri, Gábor Hofer-Szabó |
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Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Synthese. 199:13441-13469 |
ISSN: | 1573-0964 0039-7857 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-021-03382-3 |
Popis: | This essay has two main claims about EPR’s Reality Criterion. First, we claim that the application of the Reality Criterion makes an essential difference between the EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments against quantum mechanics. We show that while the EPR argument, making use of the Reality Criterion, does derive that certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are incomplete, Einstein’s later arguments, making no use of the Reality Criterion, do not prove incompleteness, but rather point to the inadequacy of the Copenhagen interpretation. We take this fact as an indication that the Reality Criterion is a crucial, indispensable component of the incompleteness argument(s). The second claim is more substantive. We argue that the Reality Criterion is a special case of the Common Cause Principle. Finally, we relate this proposal to Tim Maudlin’s recent assertion that the Reality Criterion is an analytic truth. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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