Peacekeeping: A strategic approach
| Autor: | Max Blouin |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Operations research jel:D74 05 social sciences Peacekeeping conflict responsibility to protect (R2P) jel:F53 Optimal deployment jel:H56 0506 political science Microeconomics Intervention (law) Spanish Civil War Strategic approach Political science 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration 050207 economics Non-credible threat Peacekeeping |
| Zdroj: | Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique. 51:41-63 |
| ISSN: | 1540-5982 0008-4085 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/caje.12315 |
| Popis: | This paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war, or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; a strategy which results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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