Ex post legislative evaluation in the European Union: questioning the usage of evaluations as instruments for accountability
Autor: | Ellen Mastenbroek, P.J. Zwaan, Stijn van Voorst |
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Rok vydání: | 2016 |
Předmět: |
Public Administration
Sociology and Political Science business.industry Parliament media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 050401 social sciences methods Legislation Legislature Commission Public relations Public administration 0506 political science Politics Incentive 0504 sociology Political science Accountability 050602 political science & public administration media_common.cataloged_instance European union business Institute for Management Research media_common |
Zdroj: | International Review of Administrative Sciences, 82, 621-637 International Review of Administrative Sciences, 82, 4, pp. 621-637 |
ISSN: | 0020-8523 |
Popis: | Evaluations may perform a key role in political systems as they provide a basis for parliaments to hold their executives accountable. This is equally the case in the European Union. Yet, several factors may work against the usage of European Union evaluations for accountability purposes. Members of the European Parliament work under great time pressure and executives may have little incentives to produce high-quality evaluations. This article therefore addresses the question of to what extent and when Members of the European Parliament use ex post legislative evaluations. We present an analysis of 220 evaluations, studying how many were referred to in parliamentary questions. Our main finding is that 16% of the evaluations are followed up through questions. However, the parliamentary questions hardly serve accountability aims. Members of the European Parliament mostly use evaluations for agenda-setting purposes. The main variable explaining differences in the usage of evaluations is the level of conflict between the European Parliament and Commission during the legislative process. Points for practitioners This article studies the usage of ex post evaluations of European Union legislation by Members of the European Parliament for accountability purposes by analysing European Parliament questions. It shows that MEPs ask different types of questions, referring to ex post evaluations. Most of the questions reveal forward-looking rather than backward-looking motives, aimed at agenda-setting and policy change instead of accountability. It concludes that variance in parliamentary questions about the follow-up of evaluation outcomes can be explained by the level of conflict between the European Parliament and Commission during the legislative stage. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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