Vertical Bargaining and Retail Competition: What Drives Countervailing Power?
| Autor: | Germain Gaudin |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | European Commission [Brussels], Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf = Heinrich Heine University [Düsseldorf] |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics Supply chain 05 social sciences jel:C78 jel:L81 Market concentration jel:D43 [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Competition (economics) Upstream and downstream (DNA) Downstream (manufacturing) Countervailing buyer power Bilateral oligopoly Vertical relations Bargaining Pass-through Market concentration Mergers Entry Exit 0502 economics and business jel:L13 Economics jel:L14 Countervailing power Market power 050207 economics Industrial organization ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Economic Journal Economic Journal, Wiley, 2018, 128 (614), pp.2380-2413. ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12506⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0013-0133 1468-0297 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/ecoj.12506⟩ |
| Popis: | This paper investigates the effects of changes in retail market concentration when input prices are negotiated. Results are derived from a model of bilateral Nash-bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition. Whether countervailing buyer power arises, in the form of lower negotiated prices following greater concentration downstream, depends on the pass-through rate of input prices to retail prices. Countervailing buyer power arises in equilibrium for a broad class of demand forms, and its magnitude depends on the degree of product differentiation. However, it generally does not translate into lower retail prices because of heightened market power at the retail level. The demand systems commonly used in the literature impose strong restrictions on the results. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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