Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment

Autor:	Peiran Jiao, Yan Zhou, Qilin Zhang
Přispěvatelé:	Finance, RS: GSBE EFME
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2017
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics h41 - Public Goods Punishment c92 - Design of Experiments: Laboratory Group Behavior media_common.quotation_subject Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General second-party punishment 050105 experimental psychology Group Behavior Third-party punishment d70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General 0502 economics and business Economics Public goods game 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences 050207 economics Design of Experiments: Laboratory Public Goods Law and economics media_common Public economics Third party 05 social sciences Public good Free rider problem public goods experiment c92 - Design of Experiments: Laboratory free rider
Zdroj:	Applied Economics Letters, 24(1), 54-57. Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group
ISSN:	1350-4851
Popis:	we experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than second-party punishment to increase public goods contribution. In our experiment, third parties first played the standard public goods game and then made punishment decisions as independent bystanders. We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely and less antisocially, resulting in a higher contribution level than that driven by second-party punishment. The third party’s exaggerated emotion towards free riders is proposed to explain their superior punishment effectiveness.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::49c85fab671b928e1df0715cf0b13ec0 https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6ab10604-58c2-45f9-89d1-98c41d2bddec Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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