The introduction of formal insurance and its effect on redistribution
| Autor: | Morsink, K., Anderberg, Dan, Theoretische micro-economie, UU LEG Research UUSE Multidisciplinary Economics |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Value (ethics)
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Economics and Econometrics Public economics media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences guilt Redistribution (cultural anthropology) formal insurance Altruism transfers 050105 experimental psychology norms of giving 0502 economics and business Economics A Journal 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences 050207 economics Empirical evidence Welfare media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 179(November 2020), 22 |
| ISSN: | 0167-2681 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.005 |
| Popis: | Transfers motivated by altruism, guilt, and norms of giving play an important role in supporting individuals who suffer losses due to risk. We present empirical evidence from an artefactual field experiment in Ethiopia in which we introduce formal insurance in a setting where donors make redistributive transfers to recipients who experience losses. We find that donors tend to reduce their transfers to recipients who are offered insurance, whether or not they take it up. When insurance is rejected by a recipient, transfer reductions are larger for donors who firmly expect that the recipient would take up insurance. The results are consistent with a framework in which the introduction of insurance erodes norms of giving by revealing differences in the extent to which individuals value precautionary behavior with respect to risk-taking. Welfare calculations show that when formal insurance is introduced, the welfare of those who fail to take it up may be reduced. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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