Laboratory federalism with public funds sharing

Autor:	Andreas Wagener, Ana B. Ania
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Labor mobility Government Public fund media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences laboratory federalism Redistribution (cultural anthropology) General Business Management and Accounting Decentralization redistribution evolutionary stability Microeconomics symbols.namesake Nash equilibrium 0502 economics and business Economics symbols labor mobility Federalism 050207 economics public funds sharing Welfare 050205 econometrics media_common
Zdroj:	Economic Inquiry. 59:1047-1065
ISSN:	1465-7295 0095-2583
DOI:	10.1111/ecin.12971
Popis:	Laboratory federalism hypothesizes that decentralization fosters innovation and learning in multijurisdictional systems, conducing to good policies. We discuss this using evolutionary stability, focusing in this paper on public funds sharing. In a model of rich‐to‐poor redistribution with labor mobility, where policy choices based on relative success lead to drastic welfare erosion, suitably designed sharing schemes can restore efficiency. Their necessary properties are the same as in a Nash equilibrium, showing they are a powerful corrective device for different modes of government interaction. Two drawbacks appear: reduced accuracy due to large multiplicity and a tendency to overly reward inefficiently high redistribution.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4750a3e45ba345c8583f36824f22586a https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12971 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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