On the ultrafilter representation of coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions
| Autor: | Achille Basile, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Surekha Rao |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Rao, Surekha, Basile, Achille, Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S. |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
05 social sciences
Ultrafilter Structure (category theory) Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem Function (mathematics) Range (mathematics) Simple (abstract algebra) Ultrafilters 0502 economics and business Coalitional strategy proofne 050206 economic theory Social choice theory Mathematical economics Game theory Social Choice Funtions 050205 econometrics Mathematics |
| Popis: | By means of a simple new characterization of ultrafilters, we elementarily prove, in the case of finitely many alternatives and arbitrarily large societies, that every coalitionally strategy-proof social choice function with at least three alternatives in its range is given by an ultrafilter. This provides an alternate and simple proof of results in Mihara (Soc Choice Welf 17:393–402, 2000). In case there are only two alternatives in the range of a coalitionally strategy-proof social choice function, we describe its structure, supplementing the work of Barbera et al. (Int J Game Theory 41:791–808, 2012). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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