Multi-party negotiation with preferences rather than utilities

Autor: Jean-Christophe Routier, Fabien Delecroix, Thomas Nachtergaelle, Maxime Morge
Přispěvatelé: Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Systèmes Multi-Agents et Comportements (SMAC), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Rok vydání: 2016
Předmět:
Zdroj: Multiagent and Grid Systems-An International Journal of Cloud Computing
Multiagent and Grid Systems-An International Journal of Cloud Computing, 2016, 12 (2), pp.27. ⟨10.3233/MGS-160248⟩
Multiagent and Grid Systems-An International Journal of Cloud Computing, IOS Press, 2016, 12 (2), pp.27. ⟨10.3233/MGS-160248⟩
ISSN: 1875-9076
1574-1702
DOI: 10.3233/mgs-160248
Popis: International audience; We propose here a multi-party negotiation game where agents exchange offers over a single issue. Contrary to most of existing works, we capture the agents' rationality with incomplete (weak and partial) preferences rather than with utility functions. We prove that our negotiation process is always successful and reach fair agreements when the agents are cooperative. In order to illustrate how our negotiation game can tackle distributed problem solving, we introduce a toy problem: two or more agents are paratroopers landed in an unknown maze. Since they aim to meet as soon as possible, they negotiate a rendezvous during their exploration. Our experimentations show that the added value of negotiation is a fast resolution since this adaptive heuristic shares the efforts performed by the agents.
Databáze: OpenAIRE