Clientelism by Design: Personnel Politics under Xi Jinping

Autor: Jérôme Doyon
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
Clientelism
China
Sociology and Political Science
political elite
Far East
clientelism
media_common.quotation_subject
Politikwissenschaft
Parteienstaat
Klientelismus
0507 social and economic geography
Systems of governments & states
Public administration
050701 cultural studies
politische Macht
Power (social and political)
Politics
cadre politics
Promotion (rank)
State (polity)
cadre management
Political science
050602 political science & public administration
Personality
political power
politische Elite
Political Process
Elections
Political Sociology
Political Culture
media_common
politische Willensbildung
politische Soziologie
politische Kultur
Ostasien
05 social sciences
Kaderpolitik
0506 political science
Staatsformen und Regierungssysteme
Political System
Constitution
Government
Political Science and International Relations
ddc:320
ddc:321
Staat
staatliche Organisationsformen
General Economics
Econometrics and Finance
Cult
party state
Zdroj: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
State and Society under Xi Jinping
Doyon, J 2018, ' Clientelism by design : Personnel politics under Xi Jinping ', Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 87-110 . https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261804700304
DOI: 10.1177/186810261804700304
Popis: Since Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, analysts have puzzled over how best to define his political trajectory. Is he consolidating power and building a personality cult around himself, or is he strengthening the Party as an organisation? I tackle this issue by focusing on the transformation of personnel policies under Xi. I highlight an increasing concentration of power in the hands of Party leaders at all echelons. At the institutional level, the Party increasingly controls the management and disciplining of officials. At the level of the individual cadres themselves, promotion processes are increasingly managed behind closed doors and less importance is being given to objective criteria for cadre advancement. The age-based rules which structured the promotion of officials and ensured a high level of personnel turnover within the party state are also de-emphasised. I argue that these changes are paving the way for a more clientelist and aging party state.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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