Redesigning Bitcoin’s Fee Market
| Autor: | Aviv Zohar, Or Sattath, Ron Lavi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
blockchain
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS FOS: Computer and information sciences Statistics and Probability Cryptocurrency Economics and Econometrics Blockchain Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Computer science Auction theory Payment system 02 engineering and technology auction-Theory Microeconomics Monopolistic competition Willingness to pay Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Computer Science (miscellaneous) Revenue Marketing business.industry TheoryofComputation_GENERAL 020206 networking & telecommunications Bidding cryptocurrency Computational Mathematics Bid shading Currency Issuer fee-market 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing business Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Bitcoin Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Zdroj: | WWW Lavi, R, Sattath, O & Zohar, A 2022, ' Redesigning Bitcoin's Fee Market ', ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 10, no. 1, 5, pp. 1-31 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3530799 |
| ISSN: | 2167-8383 2167-8375 |
| Popis: | The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin’s challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin’s pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the “monopolistic auction” [ 16 ], showing (i) its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, (ii) it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and (iii) simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one’s value) diminishes as the number of bids increases. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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