Hardware Trojan Detection through Information Flow Security Verification
| Autor: | Rahul Vittal, Mark Tehranipoor, Domenic Forte, Gustavo K. Contreras, Mehdi Sadi, Adib Nahiyan |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Software_OPERATINGSYSTEMS Third party Computer science business.industry 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology Intellectual property Automatic test pattern generation 020202 computer hardware & architecture ComputingMilieux_MANAGEMENTOFCOMPUTINGANDINFORMATIONSYSTEMS Trojan Hardware Trojan Embedded system 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Information flow (information theory) business Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) 021106 design practice & management |
| Zdroj: | ITC |
| DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.1803.04102 |
| Popis: | Semiconductor design houses are increasingly becoming dependent on third party vendors to procure intellectual property (IP) and meet time-to-market constraints. However, these third party IPs cannot be trusted as hardware Trojans can be maliciously inserted into them by untrusted vendors. While different approaches have been proposed to detect Trojans in third party IPs, their limitations have not been extensively studied. In this paper, we analyze the limitations of the state-of-the-art Trojan detection techniques and demonstrate with experimental results how to defeat these detection mechanisms. We then propose a Trojan detection framework based on information flow security (IFS) verification. Our framework detects violation of IFS policies caused by Trojans without the need of white-box knowledge of the IP. We experimentally validate the efficacy of our proposed technique by accurately identifying Trojans in the trust-hub benchmarks. We also demonstrate that our technique does not share the limitations of the previously proposed Trojan detection techniques. Comment: 10 pages, 8 Figures |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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