Models for Hylomorphism
Autor: | Bruno Jacinto, Aaron J. Cotnoir |
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Přispěvatelé: | The Leverhulme Trust, University of St Andrews. Philosophy |
Rok vydání: | 2019 |
Předmět: |
Model theory
Qua-objects Atomism Junk Semantics (computer science) Computer science Cardinality Formal semantics (linguistics) Cantor T-NDAS B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion Gunk 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Mathematical proof 01 natural sciences Iterative Aristotle Rigid embodiment Hierarchy Objects Calculus Hylomorphism 0101 mathematics Parthood Neo-Aristotelian 010102 general mathematics 06 humanities and the arts Variable embodiment Philosophy Section (archaeology) 060302 philosophy Mereology Composition |
Zdroj: | Journal of Philosophical Logic. 48:909-955 |
ISSN: | 1573-0433 0022-3611 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10992-019-09501-3 |
Popis: | The research and writing of this paper was supported in part by a 2017–2018 Leverhulme Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust. In a series of papers (Fine et al., 1982; Fine, Noûs28(2), 137–158; 1994, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999) Fine develops his hylomorphic theory of embodiments. In this article, we supply a formal semantics for this theory that is adequate to the principles laid down for it in (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999). In Section 1, we lay out the theory of embodiments as Fine presents it. In Section 2, we argue on Cantorian grounds that the theory needs to be stabilized, and sketch some ways forward, discussing various choice points in modeling the view. In Section 3, we develop a formal semantics for the theory of embodiments by constructing embodiments in stages and restricting the domain of the second-order quantifiers. In Section 4 we give a few illustrative examples to show how the models deliver Finean hylomorphic consequences. In Section 5, we prove that Fine’s principles are sound with respect to this semantics. In Section 6 we present some inexpressibility results concerning Fine’s various notions of parthood and show that in our formal semantics these notions are all expressible using a single mereological primitive. In Section 7, we prove several mereological results stemming from the model theory, showing that the mereology is surprisingly robust. In Section 8, we draw some philosophical lessons from the formal semantics, and in particular respond to Koslicki’s (2008) main objection to Fine’s theory. In the appendix we present proofs of the inexpressibility results of Section 6. Publisher PDF |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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