Search for a moving target in a competitive environment

Autor: Benoit Duvocelle, Dries Vermeulen, János Flesch, Hui Min Shi
Přispěvatelé: Quantitative Economics, RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, RS: FSE DACS Mathematics Centre Maastricht, RS: GSBE Theme Data-Driven Decision-Making
Rok vydání: 2020
Předmět:
Statistics and Probability
Dynamic search
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Economics and Econometrics
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Computer science
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Set (abstract data type)
FOS: Economics and business
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
0502 economics and business
Economics - Theoretical Economics
FOS: Mathematics
050207 economics
Mathematics - Optimization and Control
Game theory
Search game
Markov chain
05 social sciences
Probability (math.PR)
Greedy strategy
Object (computer science)
Action (philosophy)
Optimization and Control (math.OC)
Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
050206 economic theory
Optimal search
Statistics
Probability and Uncertainty
Mathematical economics
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Mathematics - Probability
Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Zdroj: International Journal of Game Theory, 50(2), 547-557. Springer
ISSN: 0020-7276
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2008.09653
Popis: We consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We examine the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. The main result of the paper is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles, i.e. those strategy profiles in which the players always choose an action that maximizes their probability of immediately finding the object. We discuss various variations and extensions of the model.
Comment: 14 pages, 0 figures
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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