Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU
| Autor: | Bernhard Zangl, Lisa Kriegmair, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Berthold Rittberger |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology 0506 political science Task (project management) Blame Political science Political Science and International Relations Non compliance 050602 political science & public administration media_common.cataloged_instance European union media_common Law and economics |
| ISSN: | 0140-2382 |
| DOI: | 10.6084/m9.figshare.14559859 |
| Popis: | The politicisation of the EU renders blame avoidance for unpopular EU policies an essential task for governments. This article looks at one particular blame avoidance strategy, which governments have at their disposal in the EU policy process: the threat of non-compliance. In order to gauge its effectiveness, we present two competing arguments. According to the blame avoidance hypothesis, non-compliance enables governments to shift responsibility for unpopular policies to the EU, because the public lacks knowledge about EU policy-making. Conversely, the blame attraction hypothesis posits that threats of non-compliance will backfire and blame will stick with the government, because non-compliance mobilises constituents favouring compliance with EU rules. We test these hypotheses by analysing blame attributions in the news media covering the Italian government’s threat not to comply with the EU budget provisions in 2018. The findings support the blame attraction hypothesis, suggesting that domestic compliance constituents can impede governments’ blame-shifting attempts. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1909938 . |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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