Emergent Collaboration in Social Purpose Games
| Autor: | Robert P. Gilles, Lina Mallozzi, Roberta Messalli |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Gilles, Robert P., Mallozzi, Lina, Messalli, Roberta |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Statistics and Probability Economics and Econometrics Applied Mathematics ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design Computer Science Applications FOS: Economics and business Computational Mathematics Computational Theory and Mathematics Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Economics - Theoretical Economics Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Zdroj: | Gilles, R P, Mallozzi, L & Messalli, R 2022, ' Emergent Collaboration in Social Purpose Games ', Dynamic Games and Applications . https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00457-9 |
| Popis: | We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players (social benefits) weighted by an individual benefit parameter. This structure allows for an asymmetric assessment of the social benefit across players. We show that these games have a potential and we investigate its properties. We investigate the payoff structure and the uniqueness of Nash equilibria and social optima. Furthermore, following the literature on partial cooperation, we investigate the leadership of a single coalition of cooperators while the rest of players act as non-cooperative followers. In particular, we show that social purpose games admit the emergence of a stable coalition of cooperators for the subclass of \emph{strict} social purpose games. Due to the nature of the partial cooperative leadership equilibrium, stable coalitions of cooperators reflect a limited form of farsightedness in their formation. As a particular application, we study the tragedy of the commons game. We show that there emerges a single stable coalition of cooperators to curb the over-exploitation of the resource. 27 pages |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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