Labor Supply, Taxation, and the Use of Tax Revenues: A Real-Effort Experiment in Canada, France, and Germany

Autor: David Masclet, Claudia Keser, Claude Montmarquette
Přispěvatelé: Georg-August-University [Göttingen], Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO), Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal (UQAM), Agence Nationale de la Recherche, ANR: ANR-08-JCJC-0105-01, ANR-08-JCJC-0105,CONFLICT,Conflicts Competition and Inequality : Experimental Evidence(2008), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU), Georg-August-University = Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2020
Předmět:
Zdroj: Public Finance Review
Public Finance Review, SAGE Publications, 2020, 48 (6), pp.714-750. ⟨10.1177/1091142120960491⟩
Public Finance Review, SAGE Publications, 2020, ⟨10.1177/1091142120960491⟩
Public Finance Review, 2020, 48 (6), pp.714-750. ⟨10.1177/1091142120960491⟩
ISSN: 1091-1421
DOI: 10.1177/1091142120960491⟩
Popis: International audience; We experimentally investigated three variants of a real-effort game with taxation that differed in the degree of redistribution of tax revenue. Concretely, we compared a Leviathan scenario, where no tax is redistributed, with a situation where tax revenues are used to finance a public good involving neither a direct nor immediate monetary transfer to participants and with a scenario where direct transfer payments are made to each participant. Our results confirm previous findings of a nonlinear decreasing relationship between tax rate and work effort. We found that, for tax rates above 50 percent, the level of effort was highest under direct redistribution, followed by the public-good scenario, and by the Leviathan case. Conducting the experiment in Canada, France, and Germany, we observed average effort (and thus tax revenues) to be higher in France than in Canada and Germany. © The Author(s) 2020.
Databáze: OpenAIRE