Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
| Autor: | Urs Fischbacher, Simeon Schudy, Björn Bartling |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | University of Zurich, Schudy, Simeon |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Delegate media_common.quotation_subject jel:D63 Collective decision making 2002 Economics and Econometrics ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Outcome (game theory) Verantwortlichkeit Blame ECON Department of Economics D71 Pivotality voting responsibility attribution blame delegation experiment D72 Order (exchange) jel:C91 C92 D63 D71 D72 10007 Department of Economics Voting Wahlrecht C91 Economics ddc:330 C92 Entscheidungstheorie Stimmrecht media_common jel:C92 delegation pivotality Delegation Public economics jel:C91 experiment jel:D71 Gruppenentscheidung jel:D72 Kollektiventscheidung Collective decision making responsibility attribution voting pivotality delegation experiment Group decision-making 330 Economics 2003 Finance voting responsibility attribution Attribution D63 Finance |
| Popis: | This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary punishment that recipients assign to individual decision makers. We find that pivotal decision makers are punished significantly more for an unpopular voting outcome than non]pivotal decision makers. Our data also suggest that some voters avoid being pivotal by voting strategically in order to delegate the pivotal vote to subsequent decision makers. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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