A Dynamic Syntax Interpretation for Java Based Smart Card to Mitigate Logical Attacks
| Autor: | Tiana Razafindralambo, Jean-Louis Lanet, Bhagyalekshmy N. Thampi, Guillaume Bouffard |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | DMI (XLIM-DMI), XLIM (XLIM), Université de Limoges (UNILIM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Limoges (UNILIM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Sabu M. Thampi, Albert Y. Zomaya, Thorsten Strufe, Jose M. Alcaraz Calero, Tony Thomas |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Syntax (programming languages) Java Computer science business.industry 0211 other engineering and technologies Context (language use) 02 engineering and technology Encryption Computer security computer.software_genre Program counter Java Card Countermeasure 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Logical Attack 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing Smart card business computer Vulnerability (computing) computer.programming_language |
| Zdroj: | Recent Trends in Computer Networks and Distributed Systems Security International Conference, SNDS 2012 International Conference, SNDS 2012, Oct 2012, Trivandrum, India. pp.185-194, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-34135-9_19⟩ Communications in Computer and Information Science ISBN: 9783642341342 SNDS |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-34135-9_19⟩ |
| Popis: | International audience; Off late security problems related to smart cards have seen a significant rise and the risks of the attack are of deep concern for the industries. In this context, smart card industries try to overcome the anomaly by implementing various countermeasures. In this paper we discuss and present a powerful attack based on the vulnerability of the linker which could change the correct byte code into malicious one. During the attack, the linker interprets the instructions as tokens and are able to resolve them. Later we propose a countermeasure which scrambles the instructions of the method byte code with the Java Card Program Counter (jpc). Without the knowledge of jpc used to decrypt the byte code, an attacker cannot execute any malicious byte code. By this way we propose security interoperability for different Java Card platforms. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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