FUZZY BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM: EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF FUZZY RULES AND STRICT PREFERENCE
| Autor: | John N. Mordeson, Michael B. Gibilisco, Terry D. Clark |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Fuzzy classification
business.industry Applied Mathematics media_common.quotation_subject Machine learning computer.software_genre Type-2 fuzzy sets and systems Defuzzification Preference Computer Science Applications Cardinal voting systems Human-Computer Interaction Computational Mathematics Median voter theorem Computational Theory and Mathematics Voting Black's Median Voter Theorem fuzzy preferences fuzzy maximal set fuzzy aggregation rules fuzzy simple rules fuzzy voting rule Fuzzy number Artificial intelligence business Mathematical economics computer Mathematics media_common |
| Zdroj: | New Mathematics and Natural Computation. (02):195-217 |
| Popis: | Under certain aggregation rules, particular subsets of the voting population fully characterize the social preference relation, and the preferences of the remaining voters become irrelevant. In the traditional literature, these types of rules, i.e. voting and simple rules, have received considerable attention because they produce non-empty social maximal sets under single-peaked preference profiles but are particularly poorly behaved in multi-dimensional space. However, the effects of fuzzy preference relations on these types of rules is largely unexplored. This paper extends the analysis of voting and simple rules in the fuzzy framework. In doing so, we contribute to this literature by relaxing previous assumptions about strict preference and by illustrating that Black's Median Voter Theorem does not hold under all conceptualizations of the fuzzy maximal set. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|