Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards
| Autor: | Rocio Botta, Gerardo Blanco, Christian E. Schaerer |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
Engineering
Service (systems architecture) Sanitation business.industry Evolutionary game theory public good game Water supply General Medicine Public good Environmental economics lcsh:QA75.5-76.95 Incentive sanitation board Order (exchange) Table (database) lcsh:Electronic computers. Computer science Artificial intelligence evolution of cooperation business |
| Zdroj: | CLEI Electronic Journal, Volume: 17, Issue: 2, Pages: 7-7, Published: AUG 2014 CLEI Electronic Journal, Vol 17, Iss 2 (2014) |
| ISSN: | 0717-5000 |
| DOI: | 10.19153/cleiej.17.2.6 |
| Popis: | In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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