Power-hammering through Glitch Amplification – Attacks and Mitigation
| Autor: | Kaspar Matas, Dirk Koch, Khoa Dang Pham, Tuan Minh La |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Hardware security module
Computer Networks and Communications Computer science Crash 02 engineering and technology Hardware_INTEGRATEDCIRCUITS 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Field-programmable gate array Potential risk business.industry Fast switching Computer Science Applications 020202 computer hardware & architecture Power (physics) Glitch Computational Mathematics Hardware and Architecture Embedded system Signal Processing Dynamic demand 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing business |
| Zdroj: | FCCM Mätas, K, La, T, Pham, K & Koch, D 2020, Powerhammering through Glitch Amplification – Attacks and Mitigation . in Proceedings-28th IEEE International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines, FCCM 2020 ., 9114608, Proceedings-28th IEEE International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines, FCCM 2020, pp. 65-69 . https://doi.org/10.1109/FCCM48280.2020.00018 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/fccm48280.2020.00018 |
| Popis: | Recent work on FPGA hardware security showed a substantial potential risk through power-hammering, which uses high switching activity in order to create excessive dynamic power loads. Virtually all present power-hammering attack scenarios are based on some kind of ring oscillators for which mitigation strategies exist. In this paper, we use a different strategy to create excessive dynamic power consumption: glitch amplification. By carefully designing XOR trees, fast switching wires can be implemented that, while driving high fan-out nets, can draw enough power to crash an FPGA. In addition to the attack (which is crashing an Ultra96 board), we will present a scanner for detecting malicious glitch amplifying FPGA designs. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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