Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
| Autor: | Emma Moreno-García, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Structure (mathematical logic)
Economics and Econometrics Mechanism design Computer science media_common.quotation_subject Welfare economics 05 social sciences TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Ambiguity aversion Context (language use) Ambiguity Variety (cybernetics) Microeconomics Core (game theory) Information asymmetry Differential information Incentive compatibility 0502 economics and business Economics 050206 economic theory 050205 econometrics media_common Public finance |
| Zdroj: | Economic Theory. 69:125-147 |
| ISSN: | 1432-0479 0938-2259 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-018-1159-z |
| Popis: | We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware of the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, when joining a coalition, each consumer considers the informational risk and may be uncertain about the prior relevant to her decision. In this context, we introduce new cooperative solutions that we refer to as risky core, ambiguous core, and MEU-core. We provide existence results and a variety of properties of these concepts, including their coalitional incentive compatibility. We also formalize the intuition that the blocking power of coalitions is increasing with their information but decreasing with the degree of risk or ambiguity aversion faced by their members. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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