Effects of a Honeypot on the Cyber Grand Challenge Final Event
| Autor: | Michael F. Thompson |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Computer Science (CS) |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Service (systems architecture)
Honeypot Computer Networks and Communications Network security business.industry Computer science Event (computing) 020208 electrical & electronic engineering Vulnerability 02 engineering and technology computer.software_genre Computer security Virtual machine 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Electrical and Electronic Engineering business Law computer Buffer overflow |
| Zdroj: | IEEE Security & Privacy. 16:37-41 |
| ISSN: | 1558-4046 1540-7993 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/msp.2018.1870870 |
| Popis: | Throughout much of the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) Final Event (CFE), one team deliberately included a honeypot in the form of a simple buffer overflow within most of their “patched” services. This vulnerability could not be reached while executing on the CGC infrastructure but was trivially reachable when executing on other platforms, for example, an instrumented instance of the CGC execution environment used by a competitor during the competition to analyze software for vulnerabilities. This ruse fooled some competitors into abandoning working proofs of vulnerabilities (PoVs) to instead attack the honeypot. However, logic within the patched service designed to control execution divergence toward or away from the honeypot appears to contain a flaw, which led to the service crashing. These crashes occurred many times, to the detriment of the availability score of the honeypot’s author. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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