Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?
| Autor: | Andrew T. Forcehimes, Luke Semrau |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | School of Humanities |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
05 social sciences
Moral Responsibility 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy Humanities::Philosophy [DRNTU] Philosophy of medicine 060302 philosophy Pluralism (philosophy) Ontology Normative 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Political philosophy Sociology Reasons and Oughts Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
| Zdroj: | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21:699-717 |
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 1386-2820 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1 |
| Popis: | A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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