Labour supply, service intensity, and contracts: Theory and evidence on physicians
| Autor: | Bruce Shearer, Bernard Fortin, Nicolas Jacquemet |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Labour economics media_common.quotation_subject Service Intensity Labour Supply 0502 economics and business Remuneration Economics Salary Discrete Choice Models 050207 economics media_common Service (business) Discrete choice 050208 finance 05 social sciences Mixed Remuneration Contract Practice Patterns of Physicians [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance 3. Good health Fee-for-Service Contract Incentive Labour supply 8. Economic growth Welfare Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Panel data |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Applied Econometrics Journal of Applied Econometrics, Wiley, 2021, 36 (6), pp.686-702. ⟨10.1002/jae.2840⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0883-7252 1099-1255 |
| Popis: | International audience; Based on linked administrative and survey panel data, we analyze the labour supply behaviour of physicians who could adopt either a standard fee-for-service contract or a mixed remuneration (MR) contract. Under MR, physicians received a per diem and a reduced fee for services provided. We present estimates of a structural discrete choice model that incorporates service intensity (services provided per hour) and contract choice into a labour supply framework. We use our estimates to predict (ex ante) the effects of contracts on physician behaviour and welfare, as measured by average equivalent variations. The supply of services is reduced under a MR contract, suggesting incentives matter. Hours spent seeing patients is less sensitive to incentives than the supply of services. Our results suggest that a reform forcing all physicians to adopt the MR system would have substantially larger effects on physician behaviour than were measured under the observed reform. A pure salary (per diem) reform would sharply reduce services but would increase time spent seeing patients. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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