Armed groups: Competition and political violence

Autor:	Martin Gassebner, Paul Schaudt, Melvin H.L. Wong
Rok vydání:	2023
Předmět:	Double-counting Political violence Economics and Econometrics Competition Conflict Armed groups Terrorism Development
Zdroj:	Journal of Development Economics, 162
ISSN:	0304-3878 1872-6089
DOI:	10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103052
Popis:	We show that the proliferation of armed groups increases the amount of organized political violence. The natural death of a tribal leader provides quasi-experimental variation in the number of armed groups across districts in Pakistan. Employing event study designs and IV-regressions allows us to isolate the effect of the number of armed groups on political violence from locational fundamentals of conflict, e.g., local financing and recruiting opportunities or government capacity. In line with the idea that armed groups compete for resources and supporters, we estimate semi-elasticities of an additional armed group on political violence ranging from 50 to 60%. Introducing a novel proxy for government counter-insurgency efforts enables us to show that this increase is driven by insurgency groups and not the state. Moreover, we show that groups splitting-up compensate for their capacity loss by switching to non-capital intensive attacks. Journal of Development Economics, 162 ISSN:0304-3878 ISSN:1872-6089
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3da8ad8ada36b2afde96fc5ef6419d14 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103052 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect