Where Strategic and Evolutionary Stability Depart-A Study of Minimal Diversity Games
| Autor: | Dries Vermeulen, Dieter Balkenborg |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | QE Operations research, RS: GSBE ETBC |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
SELECTION Mathematical optimization Correlated equilibrium Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory General Mathematics strategic stability Management Science and Operations Research evolutionary stability REFORMULATION symbols.namesake Strategy STABLE EQUILIBRIA 0502 economics and business strategic form games 050207 economics Risk dominance 050205 econometrics Mathematics Strategic dominance EQUILIBRIUM POINTS 05 social sciences ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Computer Science Applications DEFINITION Nash equilibrium Best response Repeated game symbols Epsilon-equilibrium Mathematical economics |
| Zdroj: | Mathematics of Operations Research, 41(1), 278-292. Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences |
| ISSN: | 0364-765X |
| Popis: | A minimal diversity game is an n player strategic form game in which each player has m pure strategies at his disposal. The payoff to each player is always 1, unless all players select the same pure strategy, in which case, all players receive zero payoff. Such a game has a unique isolated completely mixed Nash equilibrium in which each player plays each strategy with equal probability, and a connected component of Nash equilibria consisting of those strategy profiles in which each player receives payoff 1. The Pareto superior component is shown to be asymptotically stable under a wide class of evolutionary dynamics, while the isolated equilibrium is not. In contrast, the isolated equilibrium is strategically stable, while the strategic stability of the Pareto-efficient component depends on the dimension of the component, and hence on the number of players, and the number of pure strategies. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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