Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage, authorized generics, and pay‐for‐delay deals
| Autor: | Franco Mariuzzo, Arnold Polanski, Farasat A. S. Bokhari |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
050502 law
Economics and Econometrics Patent holder Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Authorized generics Advertising General Medicine Limiting Branded drug Payment General Business Management and Accounting Outcome (game theory) Management of Technology and Innovation Generic drug 0502 economics and business First-mover advantage Business 050207 economics 0505 law media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 29:516-542 |
| ISSN: | 1530-9134 1058-6407 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/jems.12351 |
| Popis: | During patent litigation, pay-for-delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first-mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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