Free Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy
Autor: | Emanuel Ornelas, Xuepeng Liu |
---|---|
Rok vydání: | 2014 |
Předmět: |
Commercial policy
Economic integration regionalism rent destruction political regimes trade liberalization media_common.quotation_subject political regimes Regionalism rent destruction trade liberalization jel:D72 jel:F53 International economics jel:F13 Protectionism Democracy regionalism jel:F15 jel:O24 Regionalism (international relations) Economics Democratization General Economics Econometrics and Finance Rent-seeking Free trade jel:O19 media_common |
Zdroj: | American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. 6:29-70 |
ISSN: | 1945-7715 1945-7707 |
DOI: | 10.1257/mac.6.2.29 |
Popis: | We study the relationship between participation in free trade agreements (FTAs) and the sustainability of democracy. Our model shows that FTAs can critically reduce the incentive of authoritarian groups to seek power by destroying protectionist rents, thus making democracies last longer. This gives governments in unstable democracies an extra motive to form FTAs. Hence, greater democratic instability induces governments to boost their FTA commitments. In a dataset with 116 countries over 1960–2007, we find robust support for these predictions. They help to rationalize the rapid simultaneous growth of regionalism and of worldwide democratization since the late 1980s. (JEL D72, F13, F15, O19, O24) |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
Externí odkaz: |