Collective Choice Experiments

Autor:	Rick K. Wilson
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	Transitive relation media_common.quotation_subject Pareto principle Condorcet method Outcome (game theory) symbols.namesake Nash equilibrium Voting Arrow Economics symbols Positive economics Simple (philosophy) media_common
Zdroj:	The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics ISBN: 9781349951215 Behavioural and Experimental Economics ISBN: 9780230238688
Popis:	Duncan Black (1948) and Kenneth Arrow (1963) raised the key question of collective choice: if people have different preferences for policy outcomes are there general mechanisms that can (always) aggregate those preferences in consistent and coherent ways? The answer is ‘no’. Starting from simple premises involving individual transitivity, aggregate Pareto optimality and non-dictatorship there is no collective choice mechanism that yields a socially transitive outcome. Such a finding is startling given the confidence placed in democratic institutions that rely on voting mechanisms to choose a single outcome from many possible outcomes.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3b07401119536d0ef97be1794b881312 https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2820 Zobrazit plný text záznamu