Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up
| Autor: | David L. Fuller, Stéphane Auray |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), Sciences Po (Sciences Po), Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) (OFCE) |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Matching (statistics) JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility Unemployment Vacancies and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J64 - Unemployment: Models Duration Incidence and Job Search Unemployment insurance jel:E61 J65 JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility Unemployment Vacancies and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J65 - Unemployment Insurance • Severance Pay • Plant Closings Total cost media_common.quotation_subject JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J3 - Wages Compensation and Labor Costs/J.J3.J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits • Retirement Plans • Private Pensions Experience rating jel:J64 jel:J65 Empirical research experience rating 0502 economics and business ddc:330 Economics take-up rate 050207 economics matching frictions JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E6 - Macroeconomic Policy Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance and General Outlook/E.E6.E61 - Policy Objectives • Policy Designs and Consistency • Policy Coordination 050205 econometrics media_common search Actuarial science J32 05 social sciences Search Fixed effects model Administrative cost [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance jel:J32 Incentive E61 Take-up rate Negative relationship 8. Economic growth Unemployment Matching frictions J64 |
| Zdroj: | Quantitative Economics Quantitative Economics, Christopher Taber, 2020, 11 (3), pp.1059-1107. ⟨10.3982/QE940⟩ Quantitative Economics, 11(3), 1059-1107 (2020-07) |
| ISSN: | 1759-7323 1759-7331 |
| DOI: | 10.3982/qe940 |
| Popis: | In this paper, we investigate the causes and consequences of “unclaimed” unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. A search model is developed where the costs to collecting UI benefits include both a traditional “fixed” administrative cost and an endogenous cost arising from worker and firm interactions. Experience rated taxes give firms an incentive to challenge a worker's UI claim, and these challenges are costly for the worker. Exploiting data on improper denials of UI benefits across states in the U.S. system, a two‐way fixed effects analysis shows a statistically significant negative relationship between the improper denials and the UI take‐up rate, providing empirical support for our model. We calibrate the model to elasticities implied by the two‐way fixed effects regression to quantify the relative size of these UI collection costs. The results imply that on average the costs associated with firm challenges of UI claims account for 41% of the total costs of collecting, with improper denials accounting for 8% of the total cost. The endogenous collection costs imply the unemployment rate responds much slower to changes in UI benefits relative to a model with fixed collection costs. Finally, removing all eligibility requirements and allowing workers to collect UI benefits without cost shows these costs to be 4.5% of expected output net of vacancy costs. Moreover, this change has minimal impact on the unemployment rate. Unemployment insurance take‐up rate experience rating matching frictions search E61 J32 J64 J65 |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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