A Simple Economic Teaching Experiment on the Hold-Up Problem

Autor:	Timothy J. Miller, Dieter Balkenborg, Todd R. Kaplan
Rok vydání:	2012
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Class (computer programming) jel:C90 Economics education Investment (macroeconomics) Education jel:K12 Microeconomics classroom experiment holdup problem jel:L14 Economics Incomplete contracts College instruction Hold-up problem Simple (philosophy)
Zdroj:	The Journal of Economic Education. 43:377-385
ISSN:	2152-4068 0022-0485
DOI:	10.1080/00220485.2012.714310
Popis:	The hold-up problem is central to the theory of incomplete contracts. It shows how the difficulty to write complete contracts and the resulting need to renegotiate can lead to underinvestment. We describe the design of a simple teaching experiment that illustrates the hold-up problem. The model used is a simple perfect information game. The experiment can hence also be used to illustrate the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and the problem of making non-binding commitments.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3a9a8f08fbc225107e29c3f3654cbd44 https://doi.org/10.1080/00220485.2012.714310 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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