Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games

Autor: Peter Borm, M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Arantza Estévez-Fernández
Přispěvatelé: Operations Analytics, Tinbergen Institute, Econometrics and Operations Research, Research Group: Operations Research
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2020
Předmět:
Statistics and Probability
1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
Information Systems and Management
NTU-bankruptcy problem
Ordinal convexity
Compromise
media_common.quotation_subject
0211 other engineering and technologies
Stability (learning theory)
NTU bankruptcy game
02 engineering and technology
Management Science and Operations Research
NTU-bankruptcy problem
NTU-bankruptcy game
Coalitional merge convexity
Ordinal convexity
Compromise stability
Core cover
Adjusted proportional rule
01 natural sciences
NTU-bankruptcy game
Convexity
010104 statistics & probability
Compromise stability
Economics
Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics
0101 mathematics
Transferable utility
Adjusted proportional rule
Coalition-merge convexity
media_common
jel:C71
021103 operations research
Bankruptcy problem
Core (game theory)
Bankruptcy
Modeling and Simulation
Value (mathematics)
Mathematical economics
Zdroj: TOP, 28(1), 154-177. Springer Verlag
Estévez-Fernández, A, Borm, P & Fiestras-Janeiro, M G 2020, ' Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games ', TOP, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 154-177 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-019-00527-z
Top, 28, 154-177. Springer Verlag
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Universidade de Vigo (UVigo)
ISSN: 1134-5764
DOI: 10.1007/s11750-019-00527-z
Popis: In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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