Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision
| Autor: | Dittrich, Dennis A. V., Kocher, Martin G. |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Leistungsbeurteilung Test experiment incentive contracts Anreizvertrag supervision reciprocity Leistungsmotivation efficiency wages incentive contracts supervision efficiency wages experiment incomplete contracts reciprocity C91 ddc:330 J41 J31 Effizienzlohn incomplete contracts Theorie |
| DOI: | 10.5282/ubm/epub.12222 |
| Popis: | We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under standard assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. Our data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to solely rely on the reciprocity of employees. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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