Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device
| Autor: | Karine Lamiraud, Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Belliard, Régine, Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé (LIRAES (URP_ 4470)), Université de Paris (UP), Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-CY Cergy Paris Université (CY), ESSEC Business School, Essec Business School |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
050208 finance
Actuarial science Treatment adherence JEL Classification: I11 D82 media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Balance billing Context (language use) Payment [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences Signalling Signalling game 0502 economics and business Health insurance Business [SHS] Humanities and Social Sciences 050207 economics Welfare Health care systems health care economics and organizations media_common |
| Popis: | In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance (whether public, private or mixed), or a physician working in the unregulated sector, where a balance billing scheme operates. In the latter, fees might not be fully covered by health insurance, and patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyses the signalling properties of this mechanism in a context where patients are heterogenous with respect to their propensity to adhere to the prescribed treatment. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows to obtain a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and benefit of a higher care effort on behalf of their physician. We also analyse the other equilibria of the game and comment on their welfare properties. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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