Brain disorders? Not really...: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research
| Autor: | Borsboom, Denny, Cramer, Angelique, Kalis, A., LS Wijsgerige Ethiek, OFR - Ethics Institute |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Department of Methodology and Statistics, Tilburg Experience Sampling Center (TESC), Psychologische Methodenleer (Psychologie, FMG), FMG, LS Wijsgerige Ethiek, OFR - Ethics Institute |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
psychometrics
Modern medicine Physiology CULTURAL NEUROSCIENCE Cultural neuroscience CRITICAL SLOWING-DOWN 050105 experimental psychology 03 medical and health sciences Behavioral Neuroscience 0302 clinical medicine POSTTRAUMATIC-STRESS-DISORDER medicine 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences ANXIOUS TEMPERAMENT Borderline personality disorder Reductionism Conceptualization AGE-OF-ONSET philosophy 05 social sciences BORDERLINE PERSONALITY-DISORDER OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER medicine.disease psychopathology PANIC DISORDER CORTICOTROPIN-RELEASING-FACTOR Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology Common cause and special cause networks Identification (psychology) reductionism Psychology 030217 neurology & neurosurgery DOMAIN CRITERIA RDOC Psychopathology Clinical psychology Cognitive psychology |
| Zdroj: | Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42, 1. Cambridge University Press Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42:e2. CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42:e2. Cambridge University Press |
| ISSN: | 0140-525X |
| Popis: | In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett's (1987) notion ofreal patterns, and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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