A Theory of 'Too Big To Jail'
| Autor: | Bos, I. |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, Organisation,Strategy & Entrepreneurship |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
nonmonetary sanctions
class justice Justice Equity k42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law d63 - Equity Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law Inequality optimal law enforcement d63 - Equity Justice Inequality and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement FINES too big to jail Law General Economics Econometrics and Finance |
| Zdroj: | Review of Law & Economics, 17(3), 569-582. De Gruyter |
| ISSN: | 1555-5879 |
| Popis: | Motivated by some recent examples, this paper employs a model of public law enforcement to explain why it may not be in society’s interest to send criminals to prison. We establish two main findings. First, independent of the lawbreaker’s societal position, imprisonment is suboptimal when the harm from the illegal activity is sufficiently small. Second, for a given level of harm, imprisonment is suboptimal when the lawbreaker is sufficiently important. This latter result thus provides a rationale for why some parties are taken to be ‘too big to jail’. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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