Veto players in post-conflict DDR programs: evidence from Nepal and the DRC
| Autor: | Nadine Ansorg, Julia Strasheim |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Disarmament
game theory Spieltheorie disarmament Abrüstung media_common.quotation_subject Politikwissenschaft Friedens- und Konfliktforschung Sicherheitspolitik conflict Veto 0211 other engineering and technologies Peace and Conflict Research International Conflicts Security Policy Demobilization 02 engineering and technology 050601 international relations Veto-Spieler Veto-Spieler Theorie Post conflict Nepal Political science JZ Empirical evidence media_common demobilization 021110 strategic defence & security studies 05 social sciences Konflikt Demokratische Republik Kongo Democracy 0506 political science Cohesion (linguistics) Political economy Political Science and International Relations ddc:320 Demobilisierung Democratic Republic of the Congo Law Game theory |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding |
| ISSN: | 1750-2977 |
| Popis: | Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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