Cryptanalysis of chosen symmetric homomorphic schemes
| Autor: | Serge Vaudenay, Damian Vizár |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Homomorphic secret sharing
Theoretical computer science business.industry key-recovery General Mathematics Symmetric cryptography Homomorphic encryption law.invention Cryptanalysis Symmetric-key algorithm Probabilistic encryption law Known-plaintext attack symmetric encryption 40-bit encryption 56-bit encryption business Computer Science::Cryptography and Security Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Studia Scientiarum Mathematicarum Hungarica. 52:288-306 |
| ISSN: | 1588-2896 0081-6906 |
| Popis: | Since Gentry’s breakthrough result was introduced in the year 2009, the homomorphic encryption has become a very popular topic. The main contribution of Gentry’s thesis [5] was, that it has proven, that it actually is possible to design a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. However ground-breaking Gentry’s result was, the designs, that employ the bootstrapping technique suffer from terrible performance both in key generation and homomorphic evaluation of circuits. Some authors tried to design schemes, that could evaluate homomorphic circuits of arbitrarily many inputs without need of bootstrapping. This paper introduces the notion of symmetric homomorphic encryption, and analyses the security of four such proposals, published in three different papers ([2], [7], [10]). Our result is a known plaintext key-recovery attack on every one of these schemes. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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