De-biasing strategic communication
| Autor: | Gesche, Tobias |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | University of Zurich, Gesche, Tobias |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
History
Economics and Econometrics Strategic communication Polymers and Plastics conflict of interest Computer science Statement (logic) Disclosure Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Microeconomics ECON Department of Economics 10007 Department of Economics Informationspflicht ddc:330 externer Effekt Full disclosure Communication source L51 Business and International Management Misreporting Actuarial science Information structure Conflict of interest Kommunikationsstrategie 330 Economics Interessenkonflikt misreporting D82 D83 Business disclosure Lying Finance Externality |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 130:452-464 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.001 |
| Popis: | This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same time, also to more biased messages. This benefits rational receivers but exerts a negative externality from them on naive or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially inefficient. These results hold independently of the degree of the receivers' risk-aversion and for an arbitrary precision of the disclosure statement. Games and Economic Behavior, 130 ISSN:0899-8256 |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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